APT Hackers Exploit Edge Devices and Trusted Services to Deploy Persistent Malware
In recent years, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors have increasingly targeted network edge devices—such as firewalls, routers, and VPN appliances—to establish enduring access within organizational infrastructures. This strategic shift enables attackers to circumvent traditional endpoint security measures by compromising less monitored perimeter devices, thereby maintaining persistence even after system updates or reboots.
The escalation in edge device exploitation coincides with organizations bolstering their endpoint detection and response capabilities, prompting threat actors to adapt their methodologies. In 2025 alone, over 510 APT operations were documented across 67 countries, reflecting a significant surge in both the volume and sophistication of cyberattacks. Notably, researchers identified 27 critical vulnerabilities throughout the year, predominantly affecting edge infrastructure.
Chinese-affiliated threat groups have been particularly active in this domain, developing custom backdoors tailored to various device families. These backdoors are engineered to persist through firmware updates and system restarts, posing substantial challenges for detection and remediation efforts.
A key tactic employed by these actors involves the exploitation of trusted services, a strategy referred to as the Fail-of-Trust Model. In this approach, attackers compromise IT service providers, managed service vendors, or cloud platforms to gain indirect access to downstream clients. For instance, groups such as Huapi and SLIME86 have successfully infiltrated upstream providers before pivoting to target government, military, and critical infrastructure networks.
The role of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in these operations is also expanding. Attackers integrate compromised IoT endpoints into operational relay box networks, effectively masking the origins of their attacks by routing malicious traffic through seemingly legitimate infrastructure. Network Attached Storage systems are frequently utilized as reverse SSH tunnel relays, facilitating data exfiltration through intermediaries that appear benign to security monitoring systems.
Disposable Malware and Multi-Tool Intrusion Stacks
The development of malware has entered an industrialized phase characterized by the creation of customized, disposable payloads designed for single-use operations. Researchers have tracked over 300 malicious samples exhibiting this pattern, featuring lightweight loaders and downloaders that evade signature-based detection. These tools are rapidly developed, easily tailored to specific targets, and intended to be discarded after deployment.
Additionally, the deployment of multi-tool intrusion stacks has become standard practice among attackers. By utilizing multiple malware families alongside legitimate hacking tools within a single campaign, threat actors ensure that if one component is detected or blocked, others can maintain access or re-establish command-and-control channels. This fragmented approach complicates incident response efforts and prolongs the time required for complete threat eradication.
Recommendations for Organizations
To effectively counter these evolving threats, organizations should implement proactive threat hunting focused on behavioral patterns rather than relying solely on known signatures. Developing deep regional intelligence that elucidates attacker ecosystems can enable defenders to anticipate adversaries’ next moves and apply disruption at critical points in the attack chain.
By understanding and addressing the sophisticated tactics employed by APT actors, organizations can enhance their cybersecurity posture and better protect their critical infrastructure from persistent threats.
